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I will not go, I cannot go: cultural  
and social limitations of disaster 
preparedness in Asia, Africa, and 
Oceania
Sonja Ayeb-Karlsson, Dominic Kniveton, Terry Cannon, Kees van der Geest, 
Istiakh Ahmed, Erin M. Derrington, Ebinezer Florano, and Denis Opiyo Opoyo1
While much work has been invested in addressing the economic and technical basis of disaster 
preparedness, less effort has been directed towards understanding the cultural and social obsta-
cles to and opportunities for disaster risk reduction. This paper presents local insights from five 
different national settings into the cultural and social contexts of disaster preparedness. In most 
cases, an early warning system was in place, but it failed to alert people to diverse environmental 
shocks. The research findings show that despite geographical and typological differences in these 
locations, the limitations of the systems were fairly similar. In Kenya, people received warnings, 
but from contradictory systems, whereas in the Philippines and on the island of Saipan, people 
did not understand the messages or take them seriously. In Bangladesh and Nepal, however, a 
deeper cultural and religious reasoning serves to explain disasters, and how to prevent them or 
find safety when they strike.
Keywords: cultural and social attitudes, decision-making, disaster risk reduction, 
early warning system, evacuation, immobility, loss and damage, religious beliefs, 
risk perception 
Introduction
This paper presents research examples from five settings—Bangladesh, Kenya, Nepal, 
the Philippines, and Saipan (the largest of the Northern Mariana Islands, a common-
wealth of the United States situated in the Western Pacific Region)—where attempts 
at disaster risk reduction (DRR) have not worked. These failures can be broadly said 
to have occurred because DRR institutions misunderstood how people perceive 
risks, and how they behave in relation to different hazards and warnings. The find-
ings relate mainly to situations where the early warning system (EWS) in place did 
not generate expected results, owing to differences in risk perception and willingness 
to prepare for hazards, such as earthquakes, floods, and volcanic eruptions. 
 The study provides evidence of two determinants limiting the success of EWSs: 
those that are social in nature; and those that are cultural in nature.2 With regard to 
the social, the EWS failed in Kenya, the Philippines, and Saipan because of a num-
ber of factors, including how people behave in relation to (or mistrust) authorities, 
and problems with how the warnings were designed or delivered. With regard to 
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the cultural, in Bangladesh and Nepal there were mismatches between evacuation 
policies and how people themselves explained disasters, pointing to higher powers 
and beliefs. For instance, it made no sense for people to respond to a warning mes-
sage and evacuate if they believed that God would save them no matter where they 
were or if they perceived the disaster to be a punishment for unsacred behaviour.
The general assumption of many DRR organisations is that individuals will prepare 
for and evacuate in response to early warning messages (Cutter, 2003; Mitchell, 
2000; Morrison, Duncan, and Parton, 2015). Often, though, this is not the case. For 
example, people who believe that the disaster is God’s punishment for sinful activity 
may see no reason to leave. Others may assume that hazards are determined by the 
Gods who control them and thus must be respected and appeased through ritual 
(Schmuck, 2000; Stephens et al., 2013; Cannon et al., 2014). DRR organisations also 
tend to assume that EWSs that advise evacuation (normally organised via govern-
mental agencies) will be seen as useful and trusted. Yet, many people who confront 
serious hazards do not trust the government, or do not respond to warnings in the 
way that is expected.
 DRR and EWSs have been framed as key climate action mechanisms in several 
global policy frameworks, such as the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion’s Sendai Framework for DRR and Resilience 2015–2030, and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change’s 2015 Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 
2015; Wahlström, 2015). Article 8 of the Paris Agreement states that: 
Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage 
associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and 
slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and 
damage. . . . Accordingly, areas of cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, 
action and support may include: (a) Early warning systems; (b) Emergency preparedness; 
. . . [and] (e) Comprehensive risk assessment and management (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 25).
 Yet, to comprehend fully people’s risk assessment, it is crucial to remember that 
human beings are social entities with culturally-based beliefs that determine their 
response behaviour.
 This paper explores the influence of cultural and social contexts on perceptions of 
hazards and disasters and the responses to them using case studies from across the 
world. It aims to increase understanding of why people do not always act as expected 
among those framing scientific and technological ideas about disaster risks. Current 
DRR assumptions regarding people’s evacuation behaviour involve socioeconomic 
and technical approaches that assume that people will prepare and respond to early 
warning messages if they have the means to do so (Mercer et al., 2009; Bankoff, 
2015). It is presumed that people’s ‘natural’ logic is to evacuate if they can, but this is 
not always the case. Risk-related rationalities are differentiated and people’s decisions 
are influenced, inter alia, by social networks and sociocultural norms (Oliver-Smith 
and Hoffman, 1999; Cannon et al., 2014; Ayeb-Karlsson, Fox, and Kniveton, 2019).
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 People’s perceptions of the causes of disasters are strongly linked to their cultural, 
religious, and social understanding of the world. Individual behaviour is deeply influ-
enced by what is expected by the peer group and cultural and social norms (Mercer 
et al., 2009; Cheema et al., 2015). Nevertheless, such perceptions of climatic risks 
and responsive behaviour have received limited attention within academia in gen-
eral (Mitchell, 2000; Krüger et al., 2015; Morrison, Duncan, and Parton, 2015). 
Religious beliefs about hazards (relevant to a majority of the world’s population) 
are frequently regarded as sensitive and hence their impacts are avoided within aca-
demia and policymaking (Ager, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Ager, 2015; Schipper, 2015; 
McGeehan and Baker, 2017). Many DRR organisations largely underestimate, there-
fore, the effect of such beliefs in their climate-action approaches. Religion, though, 
can also serve as a platform to raise people’s awareness of disaster risks, as is done 
effectively, for instance, by Islamic Relief and the Red Cross. Religion, cultural beliefs, 
and disasters are closely connected in most societies, and arise from the fundamental 
need of people to understand and explain their everyday surroundings (Ager, Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, and Ager, 2015; Cheema et al., 2015). Seeing an extreme hazard event as 
an ‘act of God’ allows for the inability of people to control the event, and to moderate 
or avoid it through sacrifices and ‘righteous’ behaviour (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith, 
1999; Mitchell, 2000; Ager, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, and Ager, 2015).
 In the 1970s, John H. Sims and Duane D. Baumann analysed differences in response 
to hurricane and tornado strikes in the US between people who put their faith in 
God and those who felt that they had greater control through meteorological reports 
(Sims and Baumann, 1972; Baumann and Sims, 1974). The former was more passive, 
involving no preparedness or very limited action, as people felt that their fate was 
predetermined—similar cases are described by Simpson-Housley and Bradshaw (1978), 
Mitchell (2000), Schmuck (2000), and Schipper (2015). 
 Culture and religious beliefs are far from the only variables that affect people’s risk 
perceptions and willingness to heed warnings. Social differences, such as age, class, 
ethnicity, gender, or status, are also often very important factors, and are inherent 
to the social construction of the risk paradigm that has been widely adopted within 
DRR (Hewitt, 1983; Blaikie et al., 1994; Wisner et al., 2004). Yet, within this para-
digm (which can be summarised by the phrase ‘there is no such thing as a natural 
disaster’), cultural and religious aspects were generally subordinated to economics 
and politics, including acknowledging the relationship between power, hazard per-
ceptions, and disaster preparedness (Drabek, 1986; Mitchell, 2000; Bankoff, 2015). The 
social construction paradigm has become very significant in DRR, but its inherent 
claims of ‘rationality’, and scientific and technological relevance, have also led to the 
social limitations evident in some of the case studies. These bounds involve power 
relations between people within a society, and demonstrate how trust of meteorologi-
cal data can be vital. Trust and mistrust of technology, national and local government 
information, or a meteorological department can determine whether or not a warn-
ing message is regarded as reliable.
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Case studies
Case studies were conducted in Bangladesh, Kenya, Nepal, the Philippines, and 
Saipan between 2013 and 2016. The country examples are all part of larger research 
initiatives coordinated by the authors, who were thus directly involved in the col-
lection of the primary data. Each author supplied a case study summary on their local 
area of expertise, and was active in the comparative analysis. 
 Most of the research initiatives were based on a mixed-method approach, although 
the qualitative first-hand narratives principally guided the results. Each employed dif-
ferent methods, involving local people, ranging from focus-group discussions (FGDs) 
to in-depth interviews and survey questionnaires, and spotlighted an assortment of 
hazards, including cyclones/typhoons, floods, and landslides. Four of the case studies 
produced empirical findings based on fieldwork by the authors. The Philippines is 
the only desk-based case study, combined with informal interviews with disaster pre-
paredness and evaluation actors. 
 The case studies illustrate how current disaster preparedness systems can fail to 
warn and protect people owing to cultural and social limitations. The examples are 
organised into two groups: socially-based (Kenya, the Philippines, and Saipan), 
encompassing mistrust and miscommunication, power, and social hierarchies; and 
cultural and religious-based (Bangladesh and Nepal), incorporating attitudes and 
beliefs with respect to risks and their causes. 
Socially-based determinants
Flood prediction in Kenya: traditions versus technology 
Low-lying Busia County in west Kenya experiences frequent floods as the Nzoia 
River makes its way towards Lake Victoria (see Figures 1 and 2). Combined with 
Figure 1. Map showing the location of the five case study sites
Source: map data © Google 2019; markers showing the five case study sites added by the authors.
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Figure 2. Map showing the location of the Bunyala Sub-County of Busia County, Kenya
Source: map created by Dr Denis Mutama Masika at the School of Environment and Earth Sciences, 
Maseno University, Kenya, 2017.
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rapid population growth, the floods put pressure on people’s livelihoods (mainly 
farming and fishing) and on their food security,3 destroying crops, killing livestock, 
spreading waterborne diseases, and seasonally displacing temporarily thousands of 
people (Government of Kenya, 2009; Onywere et al., 2011). 
 Indigenous traditional knowledge (ITK) is a common way of dealing with climatic 
shocks. This traditional flood warning system involves observation of the behaviours 
of birds, insects, and reptiles, and changes in the air, vegetation, and water tem-
perature (Opere and Ogallo, 2006; UNEP, 2008). For instance, frogs croaking at 
night, ants suddenly appearing, or trees losing their leaves are indicators of a poten-
tial flood (Opondo and Anyona, 2013). According to respondents in Bunyala, the 
elders act as ‘prediction experts’, and are consulted, therefore, when estimating rain-
fall and predicting floods. Fishermen are also asked to gauge changes in wind patterns.
 ITK systems seem to function fairly well, although informants did highlight some 
social limits. Generational differences between younger and older citizens were noted 
as the two groups acted out their power positions. The elders did not want to share 
‘their knowledge’, leading younger citizens to state that ‘they do not share their 
knowledge, [s]ome even sell their forecasts predictions in exchange for money’. 
Consequently, they ignored ITK warnings, which they see as ‘undependable and 
inaccurate’, and instead adhered only to technology-based messages. Those elders 
making a living from their forecasts claimed that such a move ended up costing them 
their livelihoods. 
 Compounding matters is the fact that poor coordination between the two gov-
ernmental agencies in charge of the technological EWS in Kenya has resulted in 
delays in messages being broadcast on the radio.
 A household survey performed in the study site confirmed social tensions between 
people depending on ITK practices and technical systems. Respondents felt that 
the implementation of a more ‘modern and Western’ school system also prevented 
the transfer of knowledge pertaining to the traditional system from the older to the 
younger generation. 
 Supporters of a technical EWS described traditional forecasts as ‘pure witchcraft’. 
This not only fuels social tensions and heightens distrust in the traditional warning 
system, but also results in disrespect of elders.
 This case study provides an example of an alternative warning system emerging 
in a context where people already had a traditional system. Several social processes 
serve to weaken the functioning of the technological system, while undermining 
the traditional system. Those who introduced the new system failed to take account 
of clashes between the two. It was assumed that because the new system is scien-
tific and supported by technology, people would abandon their traditional predic-
tion mechanism.
Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines: miscommunication and mistrust 
When Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the Philippines on 8 November 2013, nine 
of the country’s 17 administrative regions were majorly affected by intense winds and 
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storm surge. With wind speeds of up to 300 kilometres per hour, Haiyan ended up 
being one of the strongest typhoons ever recorded in the Philippines. The govern-
ment’s final report estimated that the disaster killed nearly 6,000 people, injured more 
than 27,000 others, and displaced approximately one million (TRSDG, 2014; Lagmay 
et al., 2015; Santiago et al., 2016). 
 Tacloban City on Leyte Island (see Figure 1) was hit the hardest, as a six-metre-
high storm surge severely damaged the eastern part of the island. The government 
was caught by surprise as it had not expected a severe typhoon at this time of the 
Table 1. Typhoon Haiyan and national DRR units’ responses to issued weather forecasts 
Date Warning status
3 November 2013 The city mayor calls for an emergency meeting after receiving weather reports concerning typhoon 
activity. An initial disaster preparedness plan is made.
6 November 2013 The eye of the typhoon is located by PAGASA in the afternoon. Upon receiving the information, 
Tacloban City officials call a press conference to warn citizens. They highlight a strong incoming 
storm but do not mention a storm surge, principally because they did not fully understand what 
this meant. Tacloban City Administrator Tecson Lim said that he tried to communicate the gravity 
of the oncoming situation via the cameras. He recalled saying that ‘[i]t will be the strongest storm 
that we have ever faced’ and that ‘[p]eople will not be able to stand up straight in the heavy winds. 
The storm will be moving cars’. Lim did not mention, though, the likelihood of a storm surge, 
although it had been spotted by PAGASA. He and other city officials claimed that they had little 
comprehension of the meaning of the term, let alone how big, or fatal, it would prove. Lim added 
that: ‘What was going through my head was only the strong winds, flying objects and rain’ (Chen, 
Areddy, and Hookway, 2013).
• The evacuation process started on 6 November 2013, but only about 15,000 of Tacloban’s 
220,000 or so residents (roughly seven per cent) went to the shelters (Chen, Areddy, and 
Hookway, 2013). Most decided not to leave for the following reasons:
• They were not given a good explanation of why they should evacuate (Chen, Areddy, and 
Hookway, 2013; NDRRMC, 2013; GIZ, 2014). The inability of the disaster evacuation team to 
explain what a storm surge was and how it would affect people played an important role here.
• Some people reported believing that the typhoon warning was a hoax, similar to the one that 
they had experienced some 15 months earlier. A tsunami alert was issued in August 2012, and 
a mass evacuation ensued. The warning was later retracted as a false alarm (Chen, Areddy, and 
Hookway, 2013).
• They believed that there was nothing to fear as they had survived previous typhoons (Chen, 
Areddy, and Hookway, 2013; GIZ, 2014).
• Some people reported being afraid that thieves would steal their property if they went to the 
shelters. This fear was greater than that of dying (Chen, Areddy, and Hookway, 2013).
• They had never heard about, or experienced, a typhoon such as Haiyan. Consequently, they 
did not believe the warnings or the descriptions of what was to come (Chen, Areddy, and 
Hookway, 2013; NDRRMC, 2013; GIZ, 2014).
The evacuation teams were afraid that a forced operation would trigger violence. In addition, they 
were not sure of the severity of Haiyan so they allowed people to remain in place (NDRRMC, 2013).
7 November 2013 PAGASA issued the first warning of a potential seven-metre-high storm surge at 12.00. A second 
warning was sent out at 18.00 (GIZ, 2014).
The mayor called another emergency meeting to underscore the gravity of the approaching typhoon. 
The city officials reported still not being convinced of the likely severity. Looking back, they noted 
that familiar terms such as ‘tsunami’ would have been more effective. Minor efforts were made to 
prepare for a smaller oncoming typhoon (Chen, Areddy, and Hookway, 2013).
8 November 2013 Typhoon Haiyan made landfall over Leyte Island and Tacloban City.
Source: authors, based on a desk analysis and interviews in Chen, Areddy, and Hookway, 2013.
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year (Lagmay et al., 2015; Santiago et al., 2016). This was one reason why the residents 
of Tacloban City did not receive warning messages, or got them too late.
 According to several post-disaster reports, the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysi-
cal, Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) informed DRR units of the 
approaching typhoon six days before it made landfall. Thereafter, the national meteoro-
logical agency continued to monitor its development and provided the public with 
weather forecasts (see Table 1). The local DRR units relied on these updates to notify 
people successfully of when to start preparing, to suspend schools, and to evacuate 
(Chen, Areddy, and Hookway, 2013; NDRRMC, 2013; GIZ, 2014).
 This case study clearly illustrates how warning system failure can be non-technological 
in nature. The meteorological information was picked up, the warnings sent out, and 
the messages reached people, but two important social limitations resulted in failure: 
mistrust and miscommunication between social groups owing to the uneven distri-
bution of control, power, and welfare. It would not have mattered if more warnings 
had been issued as people did not trust them. Mistrust was reported between the 
DRR units and those at risk, between the government and the people, and between 
people. The local government did not trust the information it received from the 
meteorological experts, and people did not trust the local government’s knowledge. 
 Another crucial factor that heightened mistrust was language differences. People 
failed to communicate with one another due to a lack of familiarity with specific 
meteorological or technical terms. The meteorological agency was blamed after the 
disaster for failing to elucidate the severity of the typhoon. According to reports, the 
terminology used was only understood by scientists and technical experts (GIZ, 
2014; Rasquinho, 2014; Lagmay et al., 2015). The experts spoke ‘a language’ that 
normal people do not use or understand. The term ‘storm surge’ was vague, con-
fusing, and misrepresentative of what was to come. People related the word ‘storm’ 
to what they experience on an annual basis, and found it difficult to comprehend 
‘surge’ (Chen, Areddy, and Hookway, 2013; NDRRMC, 2013; GIZ, 2014). As a 
result, even though the warning message specified a pending storm surge of between 
five and seven metres, the information was poorly received (Lagmay et al., 2015; 
Santiago et al., 2016). People said that words such as ‘flood’, ‘tsunami’, or ‘wave’ would 
have been more appropriate. The islanders would most probably have evacuated if 
they could have visualised what was approaching (Chen, Areddy, and Hookway, 2013; 
GIZ, 2014; Rasquinho, 2014). 
 Miscommunication, though, was not the single cause of system failure. If there 
had been trust between those who understood the technical language and those 
who did not, the misunderstanding could have been addressed. The Tacloban City 
situation reveals, therefore, how social divisions can block early warning messages 
from making their way successfully to the people.
The case of Saipan: the boy who cried wolf
The extent of the 2015 Pacific typhoon season was slightly above average: 27 tropi-
cal storms; 18 typhoons; and nine super typhoons (Lea and Saunders, 2015). Tropical 
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Storm Soudelor moved towards Saipan on 1 August 2015 (see Figures 1 and 3), but it 
was not expected to produce any severe damage (Ridgell, 2015). Only hours before 
making landfall, however, it was upgraded to a typhoon (Kleeschulte, 2015; NCEI, 
2015). Ultimately, it turned out to be the largest storm to strike Saipan in nearly 30 
years (ABC News, 2015; The Weather Channel, 2015).
 The United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) issued a major 
disaster declaration on 5 August 2015 (FEMA, 2015). In the immediate wake of the 
storm, many residents were without water, and homes and roads were inaccessible.4 
 People were ill-prepared for the arrival of Soudelor, in part because previous typhoons 
had little impact, and in part because of the rapid increase in the strength of this par-
ticular event. The poor preparation meant that people did not have time to store food 
and water (Ridgell, 2015), and that the number of people who evacuated was low. 
People reported not making it to the shelters until after the typhoon had passed. When 
asked why he did not leave, a young man said: ‘It’s our culture. We live together with 
our elders. When the storms come, we don’t rush grandma. We stay together’.5 People 
living on Saipan are used to a large number of tropical storms and typhoons materi-
alising each year. Prior to Soudelor, people even arranged typhoon parties at which 
groups would gather to play games and to share food.6
 People’s attitudes towards typhoons changed after Soudelor, although there are 
still reports of complacency in cases where they are not perceived as dangerous. 
The large majority of storms that brush Saipan do not present any significant risks. 
In light of recent history and past experience, people were persuaded to believe that 
even though there is a warning, the event will not be too bad. The best metaphor 
Figure 3. Map showing the location of Saipan within the Northern Mariana Islands and 
in the north Pacific Ocean 
Source: US Department of the Interior, CNMI (Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands) Office 
of Planning and Development; modified by the authors. 
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to describe the situation is probably ‘the boy who cried wolf”. The first time the 
shepherd boy calls wolf in the fable, the villagers listen and come running to help. 
They also come running the second and third time, but then the call holds little 
credibility. People are no longer willing to make the effort anymore. Similarly, the 
perception of low risk has been validated by experience.7
 Saipan residents also claimed that as they have now just experienced a severe typhoon, 
it will be a long time until they have to do so again.8 This is yet another potentially 
risky perception that may result in people not taking warnings seriously in the future.
 This case study demonstrates that people are reproducing attitudes that can leave 
them vulnerable to risks and hazards. Warning messages are indicators that bad 
weather is approaching, but people are not very concerned about it. The system fails 
as people do not fully associate warning messages with danger. Messages are sent out 
to alert people to an approaching typhoon, but generally it does not strike the island. 
Disaster awareness training could help to ensure that people understand completely 
the range of warning signals disseminated by the system, as well as the potential danger 
of staying behind.
Cultural and religious-based determinants 
Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh in 2007: God will protect us
People in Bangladesh have experienced tremendous losses in the past, most notably 
as a result of cyclones in 1970 (Bhola), 1991 (Gorky), and 2007 (Sidr) (Shamsuddoha 
and Chowdhury, 2007; Asgary and Halim, 2011). In response to the devastating Bhola 
Cyclone in 1970, the Government of Bangladesh and the Bangladesh Red Crescent 
Society initiated a Cyclone Preparedness Programme, with an EWS component (Paul, 
2012; MoDMR, 2013; Roy et al., 2015). Recent studies show, however, that although 
warning messages were sent out, for instance, in 1991 and 2007, and people received 
them, many still decided not to evacuate (Paul et al., 2010; Penning-Rowsell, Sultana, 
and Thompson, 2013; Paul, 2014; Ahsan et al., 2016).
 Dalbanga South is a fishing- and farming-dependent village in Barisal District, 
southwest Bangladesh (see Figure 1). Here people portray cyclones as one of the most 
dangerous threats to them. Respondents described Cyclone Sidr as the most recent 
devastating disaster. The village had an EWS in place in 2007, but a number of prob-
lems made it inadequate (Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2016).
 People received alerts about Cyclone Sidr, but opted not to evacuate to a shelter. 
Instead, they tried to survive the event in their homes. As one interviewee noted:9
During Sidr we all stayed in my house. I told everybody to go to the second floor. The 
water level kept increasing that is why we had to leave the house and tried to swim across 
the field. We grabbed on to a tree, and waited until the water level went down.
 Respondents also said that sometimes messages are not sent, or they are received 
too late, limiting trust in the system. As was observed during a FGD:10
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The warning messages do not always go out. People from the other side of the village also 
cannot see the warning flags. They must come over to this side of the village to spot them. 
Sometimes, the flags even blow away in the storm.
We do not get the warning messages in time. When we finally receive them, it is already 
too late . . . by then we have already been able to see from the weather that something 
very bad is about to happen. We do not get the warning messages until it is a signal seven 
or nine [out of ten]. On top of that, the volunteers do not come here in fear of losing their 
own lives.
 Trust in the system is crucial if people are going to react to warnings. However, 
the case study also found that many people received warnings in time but still remained 
at home, owing to cultural and religious beliefs. These convictions guided people’s 
perceptions of how to deal with approaching risk. As two interviewees stated:11
No one can save us but Allah. The NGOs [non-governmental organisations] cannot do 
anything. If Allah does not want you to survive, all your efforts will be in vain and you 
will die. We must follow Allah. . . . During a cyclone, it is Allah’s wish that will deter-
mine if my house is protected. It is first when my house collapses that I will come out.
During Cyclone Sidr and Mahasen, I survived because Allah helped me. There were so 
many buildings that got washed away, but my house still stands. I stayed in my house 
throughout every single cyclone. Allah even helped us surviving the aftermath. People came 
here with food such as rice and other things. That is how we survived.
 Religion accorded people a framework on how to deal with cyclones—that is, 
what to do, where to be, and how to stay alive. People trusted that God would watch 
over them no matter where they were. This belief kept people ‘safe’ and eliminated 
their fears. In the words of two interviewees:12
When I think about why I survived that day, the day of Sidr, why I did not drown 
although the flood pulled me away. There is only one answer: Allah looked after me. 
Allah kept me safe.
I am not afraid. If Allah wants to take me, he could easily do so. What is the point of 
being afraid? It is out of my hand just like the grief that my land went into the river. It 
was Allah’s property, and he took it away. This is not a problem as he is the one who 
keeps us alive. He will make sure to feed us. If another cyclone strikes, there is nowhere to 
go since we lost our land on which we could have rebuilt our houses. You still have to keep 
your faith in Allah, and wait out the cyclones patiently in your room. What else can you 
do? This is our story, the story of every single person in this village.
 Religion was also used to explain why the village was experiencing repeated 
cyclones. Women contravening social norms, for example, was said to have angered 
Allah. In this area, women generally stay at home and do not work outside. They 
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are expected to refrain from ‘unnecessary’ movement beyond the house, or the shel-
ter. As two interviewees commented:13
Why are there so many disasters? Because we must have left his [Allah’s] path. Women 
are working outside the house and going here and there. This is not good. We have to 
return to his path. Otherwise, we will have to face the consequences. The cyclone shelter 
will not be able to save us then.
I can feel that the weather is changing. I think it is happening because we forgot about 
Allah. It is the punishment of Allah. . . . The cyclone strikes are holy creations. The same 
way God created man, he created cyclones. Therefore, God will decide how they will affect 
you. Those who have done him right, and who have followed in his footsteps will be put 
in safety.
 This case study demonstrates that people decided not to evacuate and to stay at 
home with their family for various reasons, most notably because they put their fate 
in God’s hands. If God has the power to decide if one lives or dies, ultimately it 
makes no real difference whether or not one opts to evacuate (Schmuck, 2000; 
Stephens et al., 2013). God will save you no matter where you are as long as you 
have done him right.
The landslide in Nepal in 2014: when God was not obeyed
A major landslide occurred in the densely-populated district of Sindhupalchok, situ-
ated some 80 kilometres northeast of Nepal’s capital city, Kathmandu, on 2 August 
2014 (see Figure 1). The debris created a dam that blocked the Sunkoshi River, 
resulting in households located in settlements downstream having to be evacuated 
owing to the threat of an outburst. Army engineers subsequently used force to create 
openings in the dam to reduce the risk of inundation.
 A survey conducted six months after the landslide revealed that 74.4 per cent of 
the 234 respondent households took preventive steps to guard against landslides and 
other extreme events (Van der Geest and Schindler, 2016; Van der Geest, 2018). 
However, open questions about the effectiveness and the limitations of preventive 
measures revealed that the respondents did not expect a landslide of this scale. The 
FGDs and unstructured interviews also unearthed alternative explanations of why 
the landslide had occurred and how it could have been avoided. The informants 
suspected intervention by a deity, and in hindsight, some recognised foreshadowing 
warnings from the Gods. 
 The informants pinpointed three reasons for the landslide. First, they claimed that 
Nagraj (the Hindu serpent God of rain) appeared in the area hit by the landslide 
when people were butchering cows—consuming beef goes against the Hindu tra-
dition. Second, the Nepalese Army spotted some children walking across the dam. 
When they tried to get close to save them, they disappeared. Consequently, it was 
said that a Mataji, meaning ‘respected mother’ in Hindi, had declared that the water 
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would not flow from the dam until the children were found. If they tried to move 
the debris and release the water, this would have painful repercussions. When the 
water finally burst, people reported seeing Nagraj flying eastwards at the speed of 
light. Third, the respondents stated that Mahadev (Shiva), the God of all Gods, the 
creator, ruler, and destroyer of the world, visited the valley and blocked the river 
because he wanted to take a bath. 
 The three explanations above have a few things in common, particularly the cul-
tural and religious reasoning at the heart of them: people had either wronged the 
Gods or the landslide was because of their contravention of holy rituals. This ration-
ale helped people understand the incomprehensible, and provided them with a means 
of decreasing the risk of a similar event in the future. If people obey and respect God, 
or ensure greater sacrifices, landslides may be avoided. 
 How such cultural or religious limitations influence people’s responses to disaster 
warnings or DRR measures must be acknowledged. If people believe that a disaster 
will not strike as long as they obey God, then safety will be sought through prayer 
and sacrifice, rather than via a warning system.
Analysis
The five case studies presented in this paper illustrate how cultural and social factors 
can limit the effectiveness of EWSs, and DRR programmes. The findings show, 
too, how people explain disasters in ways that make conventional DRR interven-
tions difficult.
 The social limitations referred to in this study relate to organisational or struc-
tural elements connected to the economic or political system of a society, whereas 
the cultural limitations pertain to the belief system of a society. This in no way 
suggests that the two do not overlap, however. A cultural belief system strongly 
influences a society’s social structures. Even though a belief can be thought of as 
autonomous vis-à-vis the political economy of a society, it may still have a bearing 
on its structure. For instance, where people believe that flooding is God’s punishment 
for unsacred behaviour, this results in financial investment savings for the govern-
ment and in it exercising less responsibility towards its people.
 The example of the Busia floods in Kenya revealed how two competing EWSs 
ended up competing against one another. Important social structures, such as the 
hierarchy and power relations, were brought into focus in a generational dispute. 
Elders were accused of carrying out witchcraft, whereas the village youth was said to 
have fallen into a Western state of mind, forgetting heritage. 
 When Typhoon Haiyan struck Tacloban City in the Philippines, miscommunica-
tion and mistrust were evident among social groups owing to the uneven distribu-
tion of control, power, and welfare. This was reported to be the reason why people 
chose not to evacuate. Those responsible failed to explain clearly what was pending, 
and those who did listen, failed to understand the warning. By contrast, in Saipan, 
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it was not that people did not listen to warnings about Typhoon Soudelor, but that, 
after repeated false alarms, they had been socially structured to think that such an 
event would not occur. 
 In all three of these scenarios, functional EWSs failed because of social factors. 
People in Kenya received warnings, but not from the system they supported; people 
in the Philippines received warnings, but did not understand or trust them; and 
people on the island of Saipan received warnings, but did not take them seriously. 
 The other two case studies, Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh in 2007 and the landslide 
in Nepal in 2014, were said to have happened because people must have angered 
God. Here, disaster preparedness failures were the product of a specific belief sys-
tem in society. In Bangladesh, people underlined how God will save you no matter 
where you are located, resulting in people not evacuating to shelters. Cultural, folk-
lore, and religious convictions ultimately limited the preparedness measures put in 
place by the government and DRR organisations. 
 Fatalistic attitudes can exist but they are not necessarily overly persuasive. DRR 
actors should work with local religious leaders, inter alia, to address them and to 
introduce preparedness initiatives. In Bangladesh, NGOs such as Islamic Relief 
and the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society are making great strides in this respect. 
Mosques are being used as cyclone shelters, and loud speakers for prayer are serving 
to issue warnings. However, much work still remains to be done, and detailed 
vulnerability assessments need to be conducted to establish if certain groups in 
society are more protected than others. For example, the second floors of mosques 
are at times earmarked for men, meaning that women have to shelter from cyclones 
on the riskier ground level. 
 Cultural perceptions and social behaviour are not unchangeable. They are com-
ponents of a flexible process that transforms as people relate to one another. This 
paper does not seek to use the case studies to point out obstacles that are impossible 
to overcome in specific country areas. People may view the risk of a specific disaster 
in one place at any one time in a particular way, and choose to respond accordingly, 
but they may see it differently if the threat manifests itself again. 
 The scenarios described are all context-specific. If one was to prepare a tree for 
an approaching storm, one could opt to ignore culture and social norms. However, 
disaster preparedness was made by human beings for human beings, and thus one 
cannot ignore these values. They are passed among people via social interactions, 
whether through the media or from a parent to a child.
 Cultural attitudes and social hierarchies play an important role in determining 
what climate information to trust, or whom to follow, or how to respond when told 
to evacuate. Complex considerations, as portrayed, can impede an otherwise func-
tioning system or disaster preparedness system. Ironically, during some of the local 
consultations in the study sites, a lack of training, knowledge transfer, and evaluation 
was highlighted as a potential solution to overcome these cultural and social limita-
tions. One of the problems depicted was that disaster training was often thought of 
as a pass or fail endeavour, akin to that of a driving test. However, unlike a driving 
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test, preparedness knowledge needs to be refreshed. There must be a local evaluation 
after every disaster. The people on the ground will best be able to determine what 
went wrong, and how lives could have been saved. 
Conclusion
People’s survival and protection of their livelihoods in disaster-prone parts of the 
world largely depend on messages notifying them when an event is about to occur. 
The current framing of the debate around non-evacuation behaviour, within aca-
demic and policy circles, focuses too much on socioeconomic and technical approaches. 
It is assumed that people will prepare and respond to early warning messages if they 
have the means to do so. An automatic assumption is that people’s ‘natural logic’ is 
to prepare or evacuate, but this is not always the case. The rationale concerning 
disasters and responses to them is different, and people’s decisions are influenced by 
cultural beliefs and social norms.
 Cultural and social limitations can impede a seemingly functioning disaster pre-
paredness system. Greater involvement of local residents in preparedness plans and 
EWSs, for example, and of religious actors in DRR endeavours, could help to ensure 
that people facing risky situations are better protected.
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